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To date, most warfare has taken place within what Robert J. Bunker terms "human space," meaning the traditional
four-dimensional battlespace that is discernible to the human senses.[1] In essence, war has always consisted of human
beings running, dodging, and hurling things at each other, lately with the help of machinery. Even such revolutionary
developments as gunpowder only enhanced our ability to throw things at enemies we could see and hear.
The first crude examples of autonomous weapons were probably the early experiments by the US Navy and Sperry
Gyroscope Company on unpiloted aircraft during the last years of the First World War. Then came the advent of
electronics, especially radar, and warfare began to leave the realm of human senses. Ships and planes could fire on
enemies that were no more than ghostly green images on a cathode ray tube. Later came military robots such as cruise
missiles that were able to autonomously execute missions formerly requiring manned systems. Advanced radar
engagement systems enabled pilots to locate, identify, and destroy enemy aircraft without ever seeing them. Some
robotic systems became even more independent, such as the Navy's Phalanx close-in air defense weapon, which is
"capable of autonomously performing its own search, detect, evaluation, track, engage, and kill assessment
functions."[2] Thanks to advanced sensors and information processing, target recognition and identification methods
are being developed to permit truly autonomous guided munitions. This includes munitions capable of autonomously
engaging fixed and mobile ground targets, as well as targets in air and space.[3] Warfare has begun to leave "human
space."
A long step in this direction was taken in mid-2000 when the US Senate Armed Services Committee added $246.3
million to its version of the 2001 defense authorization bill to speed development of unmanned combat systems. The
committee set two ambitious goals--within ten years, one third of all deep-strike aircraft would be unmanned; and
within 15 years, one third of ground combat vehicles would operate without human beings on board.[4] At about the
same time, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the US Army selected initial contractors
for the Army's planned Objective Force. The concept calls for "a network-centric, distributed force that will include a
manned command and control element/personnel carrier, a robotic direct-fire system, a robotic non-line of sight
system, an all-weather robotic sensor system, coupled with other layered sensors."[5] According to Lieutenant Colonel
John Blitch, program manager for DARPA's Tactical Mobile Robotics Program, "We have spent a lot of time and
energy analyzing employment concepts for portable robotic platforms over the last few years and are convinced of
their revolutionary impact on dismounted warfare."[6] These initiatives and others are rapidly taking us to a place
where we may not want to go, but probably are unable to avoid.
Once this progression of ever more capable machines began, the US armed forces, and those of other advanced
countries, started down a road that will probably remove warfare almost entirely from human hands. Several trends are
contributing to this unsettling development, but the most important one is the rise of computer-driven information
systems coupled with the proliferation of mobile autonomous and semi-autonomous systems (i.e. "robots"). The
devices created by this coupling greatly increase the speed at which things happen, especially weapon effects and
information processing. A much less noticed trend, the development of very cheap and very small military systems,
will also help to move warfare even further out of "human space." In combination, these advances have a synergistic
effect. More and more aspects of warfighting are not only leaving the realm of human senses, but also crossing outside
the limits of human reaction times. The effect of these trends is already being enhanced by the emergence of directed
energy weapons (DEWs) with their capacity for engagement at the speed of light.

In short, the military systems (including weapons) now on the horizon will be too fast, too small, too numerous, and
will create an environment too complex for humans to direct. Furthermore, the proliferation of information-based
systems will produce a data overload that will make it difficult or impossible for humans to directly intervene in
decisionmaking. This is not a consideration for the remote science-fiction future. Weapons and other military systems
already under development will function at increasingly higher levels of complexity and responsibility--and
increasingly without meaningful human intervention.
According to the US Army Infantry School, "We intend to transform the Army, all components, into a standard design
with internetted C4ISR."[7] And, it is well known that various "digital army" initiatives such as the Land Warrior
system and the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below are under way.[8] Likewise, a number of unmanned
and semi-autonomous systems are already in wide use, and autonomous systems are in prototype or development.[9]
The first operational light-speed weapon, the US Air Force's Yal-1a Attack Laser (also known as ABL or Airborne
Laser), is slated for operational readiness by 2003. Others, such as high-power microwave and particle-beam devices,
are under development.[10] At Sandia National Laboratories, tiny MEMS (Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems)
already exist in prototype form.[11]
None of this is accidental. For one thing, it is national policy, articulated by former President Bill Clinton as a critical
part of the national security strategy.[12] Second, it has been pursued tenaciously by the military despite expense,
setbacks, and criticism. Knowledge is seen as the key to "battlefield dominance," and speed is seen as the key to
exploiting that knowledge. We have made these two qualities--knowledge (information) and speed--the keystones of
planning for the future Army and the other services as well. Army After Next (AAN) forces are expected to need both
"linear speed" (speed across the ground) and "angular speed" (the ability to out-think and anticipate) in order to survive
and win on future battlefields.[13] Like the chiefs of the other services, General Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of
Staff, has clearly stated that he endorses this concept.[14] It is believed that these qualities--information dominance,
combined with speed and agility--will lead to military dominance at all levels of warfare: strategic, operational, and
tactical.[15]
Military discussions of advanced warfighting (as opposed to scientific or technical ones) occasionally include the
reassurance that there will always be an immediate, direct, and intimate connection between human beings and
warfighting. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "The purpose of technology is to equip the man. We must not fall
prey to the mistaken notion technology can reduce warfare to simply manning the equipment."[16] As a white paper
from the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) put it, "Autonomous unmanned systems will be
fully adaptive to unforeseen changes while remaining completely predictable in mission performance."[17]
We are faced with the prospect of equipment that not only does not require soldiers to operate it, but may be defeated
if humans do attempt to exert control in any direct way. It is easy to see a steadily decreasing role for humans in direct
combat as the 21st century progresses.
Information Systems
The fundamental development underlying the loss of human control is that of automated information systems.
Furthermore, the impressive current capabilities of such systems may only hint at their future capacity. Quoting again
from the TRADOC white paper:
Advances in computer architecture and machine intelligence will have reached the point where intelligent
agents can analyze the environment and current battle situation, search likely target areas, detect and
analyze targets, assist in attack decisions, select and dispense munitions, and report results. These
unmanned systems will augment manned platforms in every facet of operations on the ground, sea, air,
and space, including information dominance and manipulation.[18]
The difference between a machine that can do all these things and "assist in attack decisions" and one that makes its
own "attack decisions" is a matter of programming. This is a description of machines that can function autonomously
to conduct warfare at the tactical level. If anything, this description is probably a gross understatement.
Current computers have not even begun to approach their theoretical limits, and those limits continue to recede. In

1998, scientists at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico announced that they had been able to
consistently manipulate subatomic particles, thus opening to the way for computation and communication systems
orders of magnitude smaller and faster than the ones now in existence.[19] In 1999 researchers at UCLA and HewlettPackard succeeded in constructing microscopic integrated circuits using single molecules as building blocks. James
Heath, the UCLA professor leading the project, suggested that a molecular computer with the processing power of 100
conventional personal computers would be about the size of a grain of salt. The implications are almost unimaginable-cheap, ubiquitous supercomputing, and unlimited memory capacity in devices so small that they are on the scale of
insects.[20]
This is not to suggest that there will ever be an overriding decision to exclude humans from decisionmaking. Instead,
we will continue to pretend to be in complete control while leading ourselves gradually and incrementally toward
systems whose logic demands that human control become more abstract with less and less direct participation.
Mastering the OODA Loop
The entry point for automated systems to join the military decisionmaking process is described in abstract form by the
so-called "OODA" Loop: observe, orient, decide, and act.[21] For purposes of this discussion, the loop can be seen as
beginning with "observation," and indeed there will be a great deal of observation connected with future military
organizations.
An enormous amount of attention (and money) has been invested in observation in the form of new surveillance and
reconnaissance technology. Development of these capabilities has become increasingly vital with the Army Chief of
Staff's 1999 announcement that he plans to field units whose very survival is largely dependent on information
collection and advanced information systems.[22] This meshes nicely with the TRADOC view of the future: "The use
of multiple, inexpensive unmanned platforms with modular sensor and information-gathering devices provide for an
almost unlimited ability to analyze the battlespace. These sensor platforms will be land-based (both mobile and
stationary), airborne, and space-based."[23] As explained by Major General John Thomas, commander of the US
Army Intelligence Center at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, this kind of information saturation is essential. The Army's new
lightly armored "medium brigades" will have intelligence and sensor assets equivalent to those of a full division. These
new brigades are expected to survive by using these assets to avoid the enemy, using superior knowledge, terrain, and
agility to remain out of enemy fields of fire. According to General Thomas, "Probably the largest and most exciting
area is in robotics so that many of these sensors can be automatically emplaced and maybe even autonomously
emplaced."[24]
But victory does not always go the commander with the best observation. It goes to the one that can best process
observation into data, data into information, information into orders, and then orders into action. The process is
continuous--the results of action are observed, starting the process all over again. The individual functions involved
have been enshrined in military jargon as the OODA Loop mentioned above.[25] The notion of mastering this process,
"getting inside the enemy's decision loop" (i.e. execute the OODA process more quickly than the enemy) is at the heart
of the digital Army and the information warfare concept.
By 2025, speed-of-light engagement will be a common feature of military conflict. Future architectures envision a new
array of ground- and space-based sensors, uninhabited combat aerial vehicles (UCAV), and missile defense
technologies that will take advantage of directed energy weapons. Air, sea, land, and space forces will be both faster
and more agile. Adversaries will take advantage of these characteristics to operate faster than a defender can observe
the activity, orient himself, decide how to respond, and act on that decision. The attacker thus places himself "inside"
the defender's OODA Loop, destroying an adversary's ability to conduct an active defense.[26]
To master the OODA Loop in this demanding environment, military leaders are pushing hard for the technology to
obtain and process more information more rapidly. This push attempts to achieve the core capability of information
dominance, "the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information while denying an adversary the ability to do
the same."[27] From the perspective of an Army organized around automated information systems, the struggle to get
inside the enemy decision loop is one of processing power, the ability to move through the loop ever more rapidly.
When improved sensors are coupled with extensive communications links and advanced data-processing, the result is

an ever-increasing flow of detailed information. Unfortunately, the explosion of available information inevitably
results in information overload and flawed decisionmaking. Human beings commonly deal with this by ignoring much
of the inflow, thus negating the purpose of the information systems in the first place. Recent exercises reveal an
alarming number of unread messages because of information overload. As the quantity of data rises, the difficulty of
preparing and interpreting it for decisionmaking grows. Furthermore, more information, flowing more efficiently, can
easily give the commander conflicting perspectives of the battlespace. Soon it becomes obvious that the slowest
element in the process is the human decisionmaker. By reducing the human role, the entire system is enhanced.
Automated systems, using some form of artificial intelligence, may be the solution to this difficulty. As an Air Force
document asserts: "Unmanned systems will capitalize on artificial intelligence technology gains to be able to assess
operational and tactical situations and determine an appropriate course of action. The key to the success of command
and control is information. Some of these systems will not only collect data but also have the ability to analyze data
and provide recommendations to the commander."[28] Operationally, the difference between "providing" a
recommendation and "acting" on a recommendation is merely a software tweak.
Automated systems can certainly reduce the pressure of information saturation and eliminate conflicts, but at a price.
Essentially, they do so by creating a series of information "filters" that establish priorities and eliminate marginal data,
reconcile the remaining information conflicts, and present a consensus picture of the situation. All of this is invisible
to the ultimate consumer, out of his or her control and very likely not well understood. This means that the commander
is receiving a picture of the battlefield that is designed to emphasize certain things while de-emphasizing others. Still
other factors are omitted entirely.
Autonomy
STAR 21, an Army study of 21st-century needs, concluded that unmanned systems will become prevalent on the land
battlefield.[29] The rise of unmanned ground systems is the most important step toward autonomous systems for land
warfare, a rise that is already in full progress. As envisioned by the Army Training and Doctrine Command:
Unmanned systems will operate throughout the depth, width, and breadth of the battlespace, providing
both the real-time intelligence necessary for the commander to locate and identify key targets, as well as
the means to destroy them. . . . [A]utonomous convoys loaded with the necessary supplies to replenish
expenditures can be dispatched from ports or airheads to central logistics bases. From there, the unmanned
systems can transport the supplies further forward. . . .
Future battles will have unmanned systems as forward sensor/observers detecting and identifying highvalue targets and calling for fires.[30]
Unmanned systems have been around for a long time in the form of multimillion-dollar cruise missiles and the like.
After all, the long-range cruise missile is nothing more than an unmanned bomber, an autonomous aerial vehicle or,
simply put, a robot.[31] But now such systems are cheaper, smaller, and more capable than seemed possible even a
few years ago. In 1998, for example, an autonomous aircraft no bigger than a large model airplane and weighing just
29 pounds flew across the Atlantic Ocean, successfully arriving at a predetermined destination.[32] The US
Department of Defense has an extensive military robotics program, and by 2005 DOD is expected to spend $72 million
on unmanned ground vehicles alone.[33] Unmanned systems have supported the Bosnia mission in the areas of
reconnaissance (with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) and mine-clearing using Standardized Robotic System kits on
manned platforms.[34] The DARPA Unmanned Ground Vehicle Demo 11 program has fielded four HMMWVs
reconfigured as unmanned scout vehicles.[35]
The difference between a truly autonomous system and one that is merely unmanned is another question of processing
power. As mentioned earlier, the coming micro-miniaturization of computer systems will eventually make it possible to
pack computing power greater than a year 2001 mainframe system into a device that is barely visible.[36] The
immediate prospect is for cheap computers small enough to be used in almost any device, followed at some point in
the more distant future by ubiquitous supercomputing and unlimited memory capacity in devices that are literally
microscopic. These developments are important for their own sake, but also in the present context because they set the

stage for autonomy.
As the TRADOC white paper put it, "Unmanned systems may have the ability to learn. The concept of collective
leadership and subordination will then permit systems working under human supervision to assist the warfighter in the
accomplishment of his mission."[37] As this quote suggests, TRADOC publications in particular are careful to specify
that human decisionmaking will be involved at some level in the operation of these systems. However, there is no a
priori reason why this should be so. Inevitably, some adversary will decide that eliminating humans from the military
decision cycle at the tactical level will confer a significant advantage, forcing others to follow suit.
The logic leading to fully autonomous systems seems inescapable. Clearly, the armed forces will want a "person in the
loop" no matter how capable the automated system may become. However, if this person has a meaningful role in the
operation of the system (for example, a tank, fighting ship, or warplane), then he or she will obviously be the most
critical (and probably the most vulnerable) component of the system as well as the most difficult to replace. The
obvious course for an adversary attacking the tank, ship, or plane is to concentrate on attacking the human component.
This probability creates serious design restraints and restrictions in performance since protecting the human becomes
critically important and imposes a burden in armor, life support, sustainable g-forces, and so forth. This provides a
strong incentive not to include humans in the systems at all.
The obvious response to this threat is that favored by the Air Force for some applications, "fly-by-wire." This means
simply that a human located safely away from the battle scene remotely pilots the aircraft by radio control. In
principle, there is no reason this solution could not be applied to ground vehicles and ships, or at least to surface
vessels (submarines present a different problem). Unfortunately this solution has its own vulnerabilities--the enemy's
priority then becomes to attack the remote control links electromagnetically by jamming or physically by attacking the
transmitter.[38] This becomes all the more troublesome when cross-continental control is required. Having extended
links gives the enemy a logical place to attack that is hard to defend. Systems will need at least some measure of local
autonomy in order to survive. Fully autonomous systems avoid all these difficulties while allowing a less vulnerable,
higher performance system.
But even if full autonomy is rejected, the presence of humans making critical decisions still does not avoid the issue.
Given that such persons have a real, rather than merely symbolic, role in the command and control of the fighting
system, consideration must be given to the possibility that they will be injured or killed and cannot carry out their
duties. It seems unreasonable that the highly trained crew and their multimillion-dollar ship or aircraft would simply
be written off as a casualty. It is far more sensible to design the system so as to continue to operate the plane or vessel
and, if necessary, continue the fight. This is nothing more than autonomy arrived at by a slightly different route.
The trend toward reliance on automation and artificial intelligence can be seen in the Navy's Smart Ship Program,
which is spending millions of dollars to replace personnel with technology. By 2005, this program is expected to
reduce the number of sailors on the Navy's 27 CG 47 Ticonderoga-class cruisers by replacing them with new control,
automation, damage control, and information technologies. Shortly afterward, 57 of the DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class
destroyers will be likewise refitted. According to Navy plans, the crew of the new DD-21 "land attack" destroyers
could number as few as 95. Current destroyers and cruisers carry more than 300 sailors on board.[39] These
improvements aren't cheap. Refitting the 27 Ticonderoga-class cruisers alone will cost $124 million. But according to
a Navy assessment, lower manpower costs, less maintenance, and fewer support costs will save nearly $3 million a
year per ship.[40] Another example is the "arsenal ship" proposal in which a stealthy, unmanned vessel would loiter
off an enemy shore and fire guns or missiles at the command of air or ground forces located elsewhere.[41]
In sum, this approach results in the development of systems that take the operator "out of the loop," shifting the role of
the human operator from that of an active controller to that of a supervisor who serves in a fail-safe capacity in the
event of system malfunction. Unfortunately, the role of passive monitor seems to be a task for which humans are
poorly suited.[42]
Speed
Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs), including laser, microwave, and charged particle or neutral particle beam devices,
are a major emerging military technology that enormously increases the speed with which weapon effects occur. All

are based on the emission of electromagnetic energy at different frequencies, usually in focused beams. They can be
vastly more accurate than conventional weapons because they follow line-of-sight rather than ballistic trajectories, thus
eliminating all the problems of ballistics.[43] Researchers and engineers are now developing a wide range of these
devices.[44] The first operational laser weapon, the US Air Force's Yal-1a Attack Laser, will be followed by Army and
Navy systems. One of these, the Army's Tactical High Energy Laser Demonstrator, scored a first on 28 August 2000 by
using a deployable laser system to successfully track and destroy a salvo of two Katyusha artillery rockets in flight.
Other applications are being examined through the Army's "virtual test bed" for vehicle-mounted directed energy
weapons.[45]
One advantage of such weapons is that missing the target is less important, since the system will be able to cycle
quickly and fire off another speed-of-light burst, this time having corrected its aim. With DEWs, active
countermeasures (dodging, throwing chaff, deploying decoys, returning fire) become enormously more difficult and in
many cases impossible. It is hard to see many roles for humans in this kind of lightning duel. Human perceptions and
motor coordination skills are simply not capable of intervening usefully. Defense then relies on instantaneous,
automated responses and passive measures, of which the best are probably speed and size. Small, agile, very fastmoving targets, other things being equal, are harder to detect and much harder to hit.[46] This will place a premium on
micro-systems, to be discussed later. The same qualities that make such systems harder to target and strike also make
them much more difficult to control in anything approaching human "real-time."[47]
As indicated by the Army's tactical laser systems, DEWs are not limited to strategic weapon systems.[48] A variety of
threats--short-range rockets and artillery, UAVs, cruise missiles, pop-up helicopters--can appear quickly and without
warning. When a threat is not detected until late or its unmasked time is short, there is no second chance. Countering
these threats requires a weapon that is fast, accurate, and close-in. On 22 April 1999, Boeing completed proof-ofconcept testing of a new tactical high-energy chemical laser. As described by Boeing, this technology "permits . . .
highly mobile, self-contained laser weapons with significant lethality at engagement ranges up to 10 km for ground-toair defensive systems, and over 20 km for air-to-ground or air-to-air systems." The company's plans include "complete
weapon systems in roll-on, roll-off installations for rotorcraft (V-22, CH-47), aircraft (AC-130), and ground vehicles."
Boeing says that such a system could be ready in about two years.[49] With different sensors and fire control it also
offers a unique ultra-precise strike capability for operations other than war, where pinpoint accuracy, tactical stand-off,
and no collateral damage are dominant considerations.[50]
Perhaps the extreme example of warfare outside "human space" is that of "netwar"--electronic conflict within and
among computer systems attacking the full spectrum of opposing military and civilian information systems (including
computer-controlled networks such as communications, logistics, and transportation). By its nature, the speed of such
conflict is limited only by the speed of the electronic circuits in which it occurs. This is another example of conflict
that will quickly escalate out of human control due to its complexity and rapidity. Netwar attacks may be too pervasive
and rapid for human intervention, adapting instantly to responses. Both attack and defense will be completely
automated, because humans are far too slow to participate.[51]
Smaller and Smaller
Small systems are highly desirable for military purposes, especially in a force-projection Army. Smaller systems
require less space, thus fewer airframes to transport, and they use less fuel in operation. They are more difficult for the
enemy to detect and, once detected, harder to hit. The viability of such "small, smart, systems" was demonstrated on
11 January 1999, when Lockheed Martin began DOD-sponsored flight tests on an aircraft with a wingspan of six
inches--about the size of an outstretched hand. The aircraft, which weighs only three ounces, is one of the smallest
man-made flying objects.[52]
It is (once again) the presence of micro-electronics that makes the difference between the Lockheed Martin device and
an ordinary model airplane. Miniaturized electronic circuits have revolutionized military electronics. Similarly, the
miniaturization of mechanical systems is expected to launch another revolution. Military commanders will have very
small, very smart machines to more effectively collect target and damage assessment information with reduced risk to
personnel and decreased probability of discovery. Swarms (hundreds or thousands) of miniature autonomous vehicles
will be capable of performing tasks that are difficult or impossible today, such as locating and disabling land mines,

detecting chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, and verifying treaties.
During the 1990s, Sandia National Laboratories produced an early example of a microsystem, the Miniature
Autonomous Robotic Vehicle (MARV). MARV is one cubic inch in size and is made primarily from commercial parts
using ordinary machining techniques. Despite its small size, it contains all its needed power, sensors, computers, and
controls. MARV is severely limited in its operation, but it is leading to even smaller autonomous vehicles with greatly
enhanced mobility, more intelligence, on-board navigation and communication, as well as the ability to act
cooperatively with other robots.[53] Sandia is also developing technologies to rapidly machine, fixture, and assemble
Small Smart Machine devices, including automated assembly of parts down to 100 microns in size.[54]
At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), researchers have devised much tinier robots, similar to ants,
which exhibit certain limited aspects of intelligence and differentiated specialization, such as avoiding shadows and
staying away from each other. They are cheap and easy to reprogram. According to researchers, "Thirty-five years
from now, analogous small, lethal, sensing, emitting, flying, crawling, exploding, and thinking objects may make the
battlefield highly lethal."[55]
Very small systems have several advantages. As noted earlier, it is easier to quickly transport huge numbers of them,
both sensors and fighting systems. They also can be moved at speeds, accelerations, decelerations, and in intricate
maneuvers that human beings could never withstand. It is conceivable to move enormous numbers of these devices at
ballistic missile speeds, having them in action half a world away in minutes. In such circumstances, operating
according to preset instructions may not provide the necessary flexibility in operation, and remote control is probably
impractical. Once again, this leads us back to autonomy.
The nature of small systems is such that they are more difficult to hit with conventional projectile weapons due to their
small size and large numbers. This applies even to some DEWs, such as lasers. The logical countermeasure for very
small, smart systems deployed in large numbers is probably an energy weapon with an area effect such as an
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) device. Once again this is likely to lead to the play and counterplay of extremely rapid
autonomous systems functioning far too quickly for human intervention.
Solutions
If the problem is how to maintain meaningful human control of autonomous warfighting systems, no good solution
presents itself. One answer, of course, is to simply accept a slower information-processing rate as the price of keeping
humans in the military decision business. The problem is that some adversary will inevitably decide that the way to
defeat the human-centric systems is to attack it with systems that are not so limited.
A longer-range solution is to integrate humans and machines in a far more intimate fashion. Once form of this concept
is that of the Air Force's Information Integration Center (IIC). In this scheme, all-source information collectors would
transmit raw data to an IIC. Archival databases linked to the center would be used for historical analyses to fill
information gaps. The IIC, housed in an integrated and interconnected constellation of "smart" satellites, will analyze,
correlate, fuse, and "deconflict" all relayed data. The refined data would be relayed to human users through implanted
microscopic chips, providing users with computer-generated mental visualizations. This would allow the user to place
himself or herself into the selected battlespace.[56] It would avoid the need for clumsy interfaces by making humans a
part of the information system in a way very similar to that in which the computers are connected. But, like "fly-bywire" systems, it does depend on broadcast information at radio frequencies, raising the serious possibility of jamming
or other forms of interference.
In the further future, the arrival of very advanced, microscopic information systems may allow extremely sophisticated
data processing capacities to be made an integral part of the human brain. However, assuming this proves to be
possible, such a step may raise objections from those who object on moral and ethical grounds to blurring the
distinction between humans and machines. It also does not address the relative fragility of human beings in combat
situations.
Conclusions

The evolution and adaptation of the systems and processes described here are not as simple nor as straightforward as it
might seem. The effective use of such technologies will require rapid, effective, and close interaction between many
different systems. It will involve sophisticated command and control links as well as a variety of technical means,
including reconnaissance sensors, communication links, computers, display systems, and weapon platforms. This kind
of new and subtle interaction will require radical changes in the architecture and integration of these interconnected
and widespread intelligence absorbing, processing, and application systems. Right now, the architectures for this kind
of "system of systems" are barely in the developmental stages. The actual achievement of solutions for the integration
of such large, complex systems will be a long process involving extensive experimentation. At least another decade,
probably two, will be required.
This leaves us in something like the position of monarchies witnessing the democratic revolution at the beginning of
the 19th century. Something profound and far-reaching is going on all around us, even within our own societies. But
the advisers, courtiers, and generals that surround the throne are at a loss to determine what it means, much less what
to do about it.
Humans may retain symbolic authority, but automated systems move too fast and the factors involved are too complex
for real human comprehension. When computers are designed and programmed by other computers, the situation will
be even further from anything humans can reasonably expect to understand, much less intervene in successfully. At the
same time, loud denials can be expected from some quarters, angrily claiming that humans are as much, if not more, in
charge than ever. In a sense this will be true--the new systems will enable people to accomplish far more in war and
peace than was even conceivable before their development, or, rather, is even conceivable now. But the simple fact
remains, the farther we extend our reach outside "human space," the more we require the assistance of machines.
Future generations may come to regard tactical warfare as properly the business of machines and not appropriate for
people at all. Humans may retain control at the highest levels, making strategic decisions about where and when to
strike and, most important, the overall objectives of a conflict. But even these will increasingly be informed by
automated information systems. Direct human participation in warfare is likely to be rare. Instead, the human role will
take other forms--strategic direction perhaps, or at the very extreme, perhaps no more than the policy decision whether
to enter hostilities or not. Nevertheless, wars are a human phenomenon, arising from human needs for human purposes.
This makes intimate human participation at some level critical, or the entire exercise becomes pointless.
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